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Karl A. Boedecker, Fred W. Morgan, & Linda Berns Wright 
The Evolution of First Amendment 
Protection for Commercial Speech 
During the past 15 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has used Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission 
(1980) to expand significantly the power of the government at all levels to regulate advertising and other promo- 
tional activities. As a result, first amendment protection for commercial speech has steadily diminished. In this arti- 
cle, Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Central Hudson are reviewed to provide an update of Cohen's (1978) 
work. In addition, the current standard for identifying commercial speech is analyzed, and managerial recommen- 
dations are made to guide managers who are responsible for making promotional decisions in this increasingly re- 
stricted area. 
T he U.S. Supreme Court's distinction between com- 
mercial and noncommercial speech provides for a fun- 
damental restriction of free speech. Noncommercial 
speech, embodied in the phrases "freedom of speech" and 
"freedom of expression," is entitled to virtually full first 
amendment protection;l hence, the speaker is granted con- 
siderable latitude in stating a position. 
Commercial speech is generally considered to be com- 
munications that have the sale of a product or service as 
their ultimate goal. Content regulation of commercial 
speech is allowed to prevent false, deceptive, or misleading 
information from being transmitted (R.A. V v. City of St. Paul 
1992). In addition, the means of communications (e.g., bill- 
boards, storefront signs) can also be regulated to serve the 
interests of local communities (cf. Hays County Guardian v. 
Supple 1992; Messer v. City of Douglasville 1992). 
Commercial speech was originally afforded virtually no 
first amendment protection. The Supreme Court reversed 
this position during the 1970s, granting limited protection to 
commercial speech. Since 1980, the Court has once again 
altered the direction of first amendment decisions, resulting 
in additional bounds on both the content (subject matter and 
the explicit and imputed motives of the sender) and method 
(medium, timing, and location) of commercial communica- 
tions. Thus, marketing's promotional component is increas- 
ingly subject to restrictions originating outside the better- 
known administrative (e.g., Federal Trade Commission, 
Food and Drug Administration, and Federal Communica- 
tions Commission) and legislative domains. 
l"Fighting words" (i.e., language intended to incite violence), libel, ob- 
scene speech, and pornography are generally outside the scope of first 
amendment protection. 
Karl A. Boedecker is a professor at the McLaren College of Business, Uni- 
versity of San Francisco; Fred W. Morgan is a professor in the College of Business Administration, U iversity of Oklahoma; and Linda Berns Wright is an assistant professor at the College of Business and Industry, Missis- 
sippi State University, Starkville. 
The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of 
the application of first amendment law to various forms of 
commercial expression to develop promotional guidelines 
for marketing managers. First, we review the evolving treat- 
ment of commercial speech under the First Amendment. In 
doing so, we focus primarily on changes that have occurred 
since Cohen's (1978) work. The current standard used by 
courts to identify commercial speech is then illustrated in 
use. Finally, the impact of commercial speech regulation on 
promotional decisions is discussed. 
The Chronology of First 
Amendment Decisions 
1942-1974: Establishing and Regulating 
Commercial Speech 
In Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court 
first declared that the Constitution placed no restraints upon 
government regulation of commercial advertising (See Table 
1). Until this time, the Court had not distinguished between 
commercial and noncommercial communications and had 
explicitly extended first amendment coverage beyond news- 
papers and magazines to other media, including television, 
radio, billboards, pamphlets, and leaflets (Lovell v. Griffin 
1938). 
Subsequent to Valentine, the Court struggled inconsis- 
tently with a number of content and method issues related to 
commercial speech. First amendment protection was pro- 
vided to door-to-door distribution of religious pamphlets 
(Martin v. Struthers 1943; Murdock v. Pennsylvania 1943) 
and to political advertising (New York Times v. Sullivan 
1964). Conversely, city regulations banning door-to-door 
solicitation by salespeople were upheld in Breard v. Alexan- 
dria (1951), and the distribution of advertising leaflets on 
city streets was forbidden (Jamison v. Texas 1943). Lacking 
first amendment protection for commercial speech, govern- 
ment regulators possessed broad powers to control promo- 
tional activities by the early 1970s. 
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TABLE 1 
Judicial Tests for Analyzing Commercial Expressions 
Source 
Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942) 
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 
Bigelow v. Virginia (1975) 
Virginia Pharmacy v. Citizens'(1976) 
Central Hudson v. Public Service (1980) 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug (1983) 
Posadas v. Tourism (1986) 
SFAA v. USOC (1987) 
Board of Trustees v. Fox (1989) 
1975-1979: Reestablishing Protection of 
Commercial Speech 
The rule that commercial speech had no first amendment 
protection began to erode when the Court invalidated a Vir- 
ginia statute that criminalized the sale or circulation of any 
publication that encouraged procurement of an abortion 
(Bigelow v. Virginia 1975). The Court stated that the gov- 
ernment cannot restrict advertising where the commercial 
activity itself is legal and further noted that the "... activity 
advertised pertained to constitutional interests" (Bigelow 
1975, pp. 821-822). 
In an ensuing case, the Court struck down another Vir- 
ginia statute that had outlawed advertising of prescription 
drug prices. The Court stated that, "If there is a right to ad- 
vertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertis- 
ing..." (Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi- 
zens' Consumer Council 1976, p. 757). 
The Court did not, however, prohibit all regulation of 
commercial speech. The government could place reasonable 
restrictions upon the time, place, and manner of speech2 and 
could also enforce regulations that dealt with false, decep- 
tive, or misleading advertising. The Court pointed out that 
commercial speech protection might not exist for proposed 
illegal transactions. It also noted that a different standard 
2The "time, place, and manner" standard is applied in cases of fully pro- 
tected speech. Governments can restrict when, where, and how speech is 
delivered, provided that the regulation does not affect the content of the 
speech. Such regulations are described as "content neutral." 
Commercial Speech Test 
Is the expression made primarily for commercial gain-the "primary purpose" 
test? If yes, then speech is accorded less protection. 
Does the expression deal with matters that are primarily of public rather than pri- 
vate (e.g., financial) concern? If yes, then speech is protected. 
Does the expression convey information of potential interest to a diverse audi- 
ence not just to potential customers? If yes, then speech is protected. 
Do potential recipients of commercial information have substantial "listener inter- 
ests" served by the communications? If yes, then speech is protected? 
Commercial speech referred to as "expression related solely to the economic in- 
terests of the speaker" and "speech proposing a commercial transaction." Four- 
part test developed for evaluating commercial speech regulation: (1) Is the ex- 
pression misleading and does it deal with lawful activities? (2) Does the gov- 
ernment have substantial interest in the regulation? (3) Does the regulation ad- 
vance the government's position? and (4) Is the regulation too extensive? 
Do the various aspects of the speech combine to make the communications com- 
mercial speech? 
Is the commercial activity being advertised one that could legally be banned? If 
yes, speech associated with the activity could also be outlawed. 
Is the regulation of commercial speech no broader than necessary to advance 
the government's interest? [This does not require the regulation to be the "least 
restrictive means" possible.] 
Is the regulation of commercial speech reasonable in terms of the government's 
asserted purpose? Again, this does not require the regulation to be the "least 
restrictive means" possible. 
might apply for advertising in the electronic broadcast 
media. 
Groups were permitted to openly promote their interests 
(trade association position) or products (contraceptives) in 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1977) and Carey v. 
Population Services International (1977), respectively. The 
Court also loosened state restrictions upon advertising by 
professionals, most notably attorneys (Bates v. State Bar 
1977; In Re Primus 1978), although a lesser degree of pro- 
tection was established. In a related case, however, attorneys 
were prohibited from soliciting clients in person (Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Association 1978). Optometrists were al- 
lowed to advertise their names but not their trade names 
(Friedman v. Rogers 1979). 
During this same time the Court revoked a city ordi- 
nance that forbade the posting of real estate for sale and sold 
signs, discounting the argument that other forms of adver- 
tising were available within the community (Linmark Asso- 
ciates v. Township of Willingboro 1977). The Court noted 
that advertising alternatives such as newspapers and listings 
with real estate agents were more costly and did not reach 
prospects as readily as signs. 
This period resulted in several victories for advocates of 
limited first amendment protection for commercial speech. 
Institutional advertising seemed to be acceptable as was the 
right to advertise in various media of the advertiser's choice. 
The specific content, that is, the language of advertising was 
not seriously examined by the Court. The Court did reserve 
the government's right to place reasonable restrictions on 
promotional efforts (Virginia State Board of Pharmacy), 
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particularly if buyers were seen to be at a clear disadvantage 
relative to sellers (Ohralik; Friedman). 
1980-1985: Increasing Regulation Once Again 
Five years after Bigelow, a four-part analysis for commercial 
speech cases was crafted in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980). The New York 
Public Service Commission had ordered the state electric 
utilities not to promote the use of electricity because of a 
concern that demand would exceed supply. In 1977, the 
Commission continued its ban but allowed institutional and 
informational advertising. The Court concluded that the 
Commission had failed to show that a more limited speech 
regulation would be ineffective and therefore overturned the 
advertising ban (Central Hudson 1980, p. 571). 
As articulated in this opinion, the Court in commercial 
speech cases would proceed through the following steps 
(Central Hudson 1980, p. 566): (1) Determine whether the 
expression is protected by the First Amendment, that is, 
does it involve lawful activity and not mislead the audience? 
(2) Does the government have a substantial interest to be 
achieved by restricting the speech? (3) Does the regulation 
directly advance the government's interest? (4) Is the regu- 
lation more extensive than necessary to achieve that 
interest? 
Central Hudson amounted to a significant move in the 
direction of regulating commercial speech, including truth- 
ful statements. The fourth step of Central Hudson has be- 
come, as will be shown, the focal point of debates in later 
cases. The Court's claim that this four-part test had evolved 
from previous commercial speech cases was not document- 
ed. Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, argued that 
this test allowed the Commission to manipulate the eco- 
nomic choices of consumers by curbing their access to in- 
formation (McGowan 1990, p. 373). 
In Metromedia v. San Diego (1981) the Court, using the 
Central Hudson test, distinguished between the advertising 
medium and message. The city of San Diego had barred any 
off-premises advertising, effectively eliminating billboard 
advertising; however, the rule infringed upon the general 
public's first amendment rights to carry or post signs carry- 
ing religious or political messages. The ordinance might 
have been allowed if it dealt only with commercial messages 
on billboards. Indeed, the Metromedia Court found that the 
First Amendment permits an ordinance that allows on-site 
advertising (storefront signs and billboards), although it for- 
bids off-site advertising (billboards). 
In In Re R.M.J. (1982) the U.S. Supreme Court support- 
ed a Missouri lawyer's contention that a state rule unduly re- 
stricted (beyond the limits established in Central Hudson) 
his ability to communicate with clients and prospects. The 
attorney had merely published an ad and mailed announce- 
ment cards describing his area of specialization. 
The Court invoked Central Hudson again in Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983). This dispute involved 
a federal statute that prohibited the mailing of unsolicited 
advertisements for contraceptives. Youngs's mailings in- 
cluded informational pamphlets describing how the use of 
condoms could help prevent various disorders. The last page 
stated that Youngs, a distributor of Trojan-brand prophylac- 
tics, had provided the pamphlet as a public service. Though 
Youngs prevailed, the Court broadened the permissible 
scope of government regulation of promotional activities by 
categorizing Youngs's pamphlets as commercial speech. 
Central Hudson and its progeny represent a redirection 
in terms of deciding what degree of protection to accord 
commercial statements. Central Hudson amplified the 
Court's examination of commercial speech to include a 
judgment about the importance of regulating the subject 
matter or activity in question. The Central Hudson Court 
therefore withdrew some of the protection bestowed upon 
commercial speech during the previous five years. 
1986-1992: Extending Regulation Even Further 
The Court greatly expanded governmental powers to control 
promotional activity in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. 
Tourism Company of Puerto Rico (1986). The Puerto Rican 
legislature had legalized casino gambling but prohibited the 
casinos from promoting their facilities to Puerto Rican citi- 
zens. The Tourism Company, established by the legislature, 
administered the gaming industry. That agency prohibited 
casino franchise holders from using the word casino on any 
items accessible to people living in Puerto Rico. Posadas, a 
casino holding company, was fined for violating these regu- 
lations and subsequently challenged them. 
Reacting to Posadas's objection, the Puerto Rico Superi- 
or Court rewrote the regulations to try to resolve the first 
amendment problems. The revised standards relaxed some 
of the regulatory agency's restrictions, but nonetheless al- 
lowed use of the word casino only where the trade name of 
the hotel was used. The standards also required previous ap- 
proval of the Tourism Company for advertising and publici- 
ty addressed to tourists within Puerto Rico. 
The Court declared that advertising of casino gambling 
could be forestalled because casino gambling itself could be 
banned. So where the underlying commercial endeavor 
could be outlawed, the government can forbid promotional 
activities regarding the endeavor. Thus, Posadas substantial- 
ly reduced first amendment support for commercial com- 
munications by upholding government authority for both 
previous restraint and censorship of truthful advertising for 
a legal service. 
The regulatory expansion of Posadas continued in San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic 
Committee (1987) (SFAA v. USOC). The USOC had been 
granted exclusive use of the word Olympic by the Amateur 
Sports Act of 1978. Without USOC's permission, SFAA had 
begun using the term in promotional materials to create in- 
terest in the proposed Gay Olympic Games. The USOC ob- 
tained a permanent injunction, preventing SFAA from using 
the word Olympic in any of its activities,3 and SFAA 
appealed. 
In finding for the USOC, the Court stated that the "pos- 
sibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious" (SFAA v. 
3The Amateur Sports Act (1978) provides the USOC with broader con- 
trol over the word Olympic than would be available for a trademark under 
the Lanham Act (1988). The USOC can prohibit the use of the word even 
in situations where there is no evidence of consumer/viewer confusion. 
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USOC 1987, p. 2982). The SFAA had intended both com- 
mercial and noncommercial use of the word, including the 
sale of several items carrying the Gay Olympic Games slo- 
gan. The SFAA argued that the games would promote 
greater understanding among people of different ages, races, 
and sexual preferences. Thus, by banning the use of the 
word Olympic, the Court effectively blocked a considerable 
amount of noncommercial speech as well. 
Justice Brennan objected strongly to the SFAA decision. 
He maintained that the Amateur Sports Act restricts com- 
mercial speech beyond that required to further a substantial 
government interest-an outcome incompatible with the 
fourth step of the Central Hudson test.4 The SFAA essen- 
tially condones the arbitrary suppression of nondeceptive 
uses of the word Olympic. To protect the USOC's rights, the 
Court might have granted USOC a trademark for the word 
Olympic and required users of the word to include a con- 
spicuous disclosure statement (Garrison 1991). 
The Court next reviewed a case involving an attorney so- 
liciting prospects by letter (Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Associ- 
ation 1988) in violation of a rule prohibiting direct mail so- 
licitation for pecuniary gain. The Kentucky Supreme Court 
upheld this law, even though the letter was found not to be 
false or misleading by any reviewing body. 
The Court found for the attorney, stating that the First 
Amendment does not permit a complete ban on some forms 
of commercial speech simply because they are more effec- 
tive than other methods. The Court also decided that elimi- 
nating such communications would be inconsistent with 
Posadas,s although such a letter could result in isolated 
abuses, that is, mislead some people. The Court concluded 
that direct mail advertising is dissimilar to personal solicita- 
tion because the latter provides many more opportunities for 
undue seller influence. Direct mail, because it leaves a tan- 
gible record, is also more open to public scrutiny and prop- 
er regulation by authorities than is personal selling. Thus, 
whereas the Court allowed direct mail selling, it introduced 
reasoning that eventually could be used to regulate face-to- 
face selling under the First Amendment. 
The Court reaffirmed government power to ban promo- 
tional activities in Board of Trustees of the State University 
of New York v. Fox (1989). The trustees had issued regula- 
tions that prohibited certain commercial activities on any 
university property. Fox, a student hosting product demon- 
stration parties in dormitories, contested the regulations. 
The trial court upheld the trustees's regulations, which were 
overturned on appeal. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the appellate judg- 
ment and remanded the case for consideration of whether 
the regulations were adequate under the fourth step of Cen- 
tral Hudson. The Court opined, however, that demonstration 
4Regarding the impact on noncommercial speech, he noted that USOC 
has permitted the word Olympic to be used in reference to young persons 
(Junior Olympics and Explorer Olympics) and handicapped people (Spe- 
cial Olympics), while disallowing its use in reference to senior citizens and 
bodybuilders (SFAA v. USOC 1987, p. 2999). He asserted that restrictions 
such as these amount to arbitrary content regulation of speech, which is 
completely at odds with first amendment prohibition of restrictions that are 
not content neutral. 
5Because the practice of law cannot be banned, attorney advertising must 
therefore be lawful. 
parties amounted to commercial speech that proposed a law- 
ful transaction and was not misleading. The Court thereby 
upheld the power of a government body to prohibit the non- 
deceptive selling of legal products in an individual's resi- 
dence. Fox noticeably extended the reach of the fourth ele- 
ment of the Central Hudson test from "no more extensive 
than necessary" to the "reasonableness" of the regulation in 
the context of its objectives. The Fox Court explicitly noted 
that it will not apply a "least restrictive means possible" 
analysis to commercial speech. 
Then, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary 
Commission of Illinois (1990), the Court negated an Illinois 
rule prohibiting attorney claims of being a certified legal 
specialist. The Court found Peel's letterhead to be truthful, 
not misleading, and verifiable and therefore nondeceptive. 
The Court conceded that a state does have a right to prevent 
deception that might arise out of communications such as 
Peel's, but this interest was deemed insufficient to justify a 
categorical ban. 
1993: Refining the Central Hudson Standard 
The Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson standard in 
three 1993 commercial speech cases, probably causing more 
confusion than clarification. In City of Cincinnati v. Discov- 
ery Network (1993) and Edenfield v. Fane (1993), the Court 
rejected a city ordinance prohibiting magazine and handbill 
news racks (while allowing newspaper racks) and over- 
turned a Florida statute preventing accountants from solicit- 
ing clients in person and by phone, respectively. Although 
they met the first two prongs of the Central Hudson, both 
these rules failed the third prong, that is, neither standard di- 
rectly advanced either governmental unit's asserted inter- 
ests. Both governments could have achieved their interest in 
other ways that did not unreasonably restrict commercial 
speech. 
Conversely, the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting 
radio stations from broadcasting lottery ads in states where 
lotteries are forbidden (US and FCC v. Edge Broadcasting 
Co. 1993). A radio station in North Carolina (which has no 
lottery), with 92% of its listeners living in Virginia (which 
has a lottery), challenged the federal statute. The Court ac- 
cepted the state's argument without relying on any demon- 
strable evidence, contrary to Edenfield. 
Taken together, Edenfield and City of Cincinnati require 
the government to support its position more thoroughly 
when banning certain forms of commercial speech. Edge 
Broadcasting, however, relaxes the evidentiary requirements 
for the state. Moreover, the Court has yet to clarify the term 
reasonable6 when applied to a law regulating commercial 
speech. 
6Although the Court now seems to require the state to show through ex- 
trinsic evidence that a statute is reasonable, it has yet to offer a useful def- 
inition of the word reasonable. See Mandel (1994) for a discussion of this 
issue and a review of the 1993 Supreme Court commercial speech cases. 
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1994: Limited Developments 
In Ibanez v. Florida (1994) the Court discussed commercial 
speech issues.7 Here, the Court rejected a Florida Board of 
Accountancy ruling that sought to prevent Ibanez from dis- 
playing her Certified Financial Planner credential on her 
business cards, stationery, and Yellow Pages listing next to 
her CPA and JD designations. This decision is compatible 
with earlier rulings allowing professionals to advertise and 
recognizes the legitimacy of promoting professional organi- 
zation memberships other than state-sponsored ones. 
Summary of Commercial Speech Cases 
The U.S. Supreme Court continues to refine the distinction 
between speech proposing commercial transactions and 
other varieties of speech. More types of communication (in 
terms of topics) tend to be moving to the commercial speech 
category, thus further eroding overall first amendment pro- 
tection for commercial expression. As a result, marketers 
face a two-tiered dilemma (identifying commercial speech 
and applying the current commercial speech standard) when 
trying to gauge the border between allowable and impermis- 
sible communications. 
Working With the Current 
Commercial Speech Standard 
Marketers who are developing communications programs 
must therefore address two fundamental issues regarding the 
First Amendment. The initial concern is to develop a sense 
of the Court's current operating definition of commercial 
speech. The second issue relates to the Court's view of com- 
mercial speech content and method of communication in the 
context of Posadas and ensuing opinions. 
Identifying Commercial Speech 
The most elementary issue in a commercial speech case is 
whether the communication is in fact commercial and there- 
fore should receive a lesser degree of protection (Petty 
1993). The commercial/noncommercial distinction has been 
criticized routinely since its inception (cf. Murdock v. Penn- 
sylvania 1943; Thomas v. Collins 1945). The essential prob- 
lem is definitional: Criteria for identifying commercial 
speech are not precise and have improved very little since 
Valentine. 
Most product-specific communications typify so-called 
pure commercial speech. Product-line, product-family, and 
some forms of corporate image advertising would also be 
categorized as commercial speech. Thus, the majority of 
promotional efforts would seem to be properly classified as 
commercial speech. Gradation problems arise, however, 
when (1) the speaker is not a for-profit entity and/or is pre- 
sumably neutral regarding the subject matter, or (2) the con- 
tent of the speech includes topics that traditionally are both 
commercial and noncommercial. Such speech is labeled 
mixed and may be fully protected because of its noncom- 
7City ofLadue v. Gilleo (1994) also includes some comments about com- 
mercial speech. 
mercial aspects or treated subordinately due to its commer- 
cial component. 
Not-for-profit or neutral speakers. Many organizations 
that are legally organized as nonprofit institutions carry out 
fund-raising activities with full first amendment protection, 
except in cases of fraud.8 The most obvious examples are re- 
ligious, political, and charitable groups.9 Consider bill- 
boards sponsored by an organization that feature a renowned 
evangelist. Suppose the message urges viewers to purchase 
expensive religious icons so as to be viewed more favorably 
by the deity worshiped by the evangelist. The religious na- 
ture of the source gives it first amendment protection despite 
the fund-raising nature of the communications. 
Another relevant example for marketers relates to deal- 
ing with consumer interest groups or consumer watchdogs. 
These groups and individuals are generally allowed greater 
leeway in stating their positions about products than are the 
companies marketing these items. The Court's premise is 
that these sources of information do not stand to gain finan- 
cially from their comments; hence, their positions are pre- 
sumed to be neutral or more plausible than profit-oriented 
marketers. Thus, marketers encounter credibility problems 
when trying to negate the opinions (noncommercial speech) 
of presumably neutral sources, such as Consumer Reports 
(Redish 1990, p. 49), with their own commercial statements. 
Evaluating profit motives will be increasingly difficult to 
assess as complex business structures, such as strategic al- 
liances, emerge. For example, several competing firms may 
establish a not-for-profit joint venture to obtain research 
economies of scale. The affiliated firms benefit if this re- 
search venture proclaims that the most advanced technology 
in a given area just happens to be that of the funding com- 
panies. The not-for-profit partnership is the source of the 
statement, but for-profit companies have underwritten the 
research. The Court is likely to view such statements as 
commercial speech, unless it is convinced that the joint ven- 
ture is remote enough from its sponsors, that is, no common 
personnel, physically separate facilities, and minimal spon- 
sor control over the research agenda. 
Commercial/noncommercial topics. Health-related in- 
formation is widely available in the U.S.,10 although food 
and drug marketers have long been battling federal agencies 
for greater freedom to advertise the health benefits of their 
offerings (Calfee and Pappalardo 1991). However, commu- 
nications about the health-related impact of products are 
controversial relative to the First Amendment. For example, 
Retin-A has recently been observed to lighten liver spots, a 
8Commercial speech that is acceptable under the First Amendment is not 
protected if it leads to statutory violations (cf. ES Development v. RWM En- 
terprises 1991). 
9See, for example, Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) and Gaudiya Vaish- 
nava Society v. San Francisco (1991)-religion; Boos v. Barry (1988)- 
politics; Schneider v. State (1939)-charity. For a discussion of these pri- 
mary first amendment topics, see Caywood and Preston (1989) or Estlund 
(1990). 
lOThe federal government assembles health information for international 
travelers (Wade 1992), and cable television networks provide several chan- 
nels that concentrate on health-related topics (Husni 1991). At the same 
time, food marketers claim that consumers are demanding more health-re- 
lated information (Dowdell and Crispens 1991). 
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TABLE 2 
Issues of Concern in an Analysis of Commercial Expression 
Concerns of the Court 
Message sender 
Message receiver 
Message content 
Medium 
Govenltent's role 
in piotecting: 
Sender 
Receiver 
Public 
Right to communicate with target markets or the general public 
Right to receive information about products/choices; right to ignore information; right not to be "exposed 
too aggressively" to information 
Information versus persuasion; product information versus corporate image information versus general 
information; social importance 
Intrusiveness; pervasiveness; alternative media (availability and cost effectiveness) 
Reasonable access to media 
Balancing knowledge between sender and receiver; balancing power between sender and receiver 
Minimum, established standards; avoiding unwarranted intrusions; restricted, sensitive topics 
finding reported by the same research team at the Universi- 
ty of Michigan that four years earlier discovered that Retin- 
A smooths facial wrinkles (Waldholz 1992). This research 
project was funded in part by Johnson & Johnson (J&J), 
which manufactures and markets the drug and arguably ben- 
efits from these findings. 
Given the same study and findings, Michigan would be 
given greater freedom to state its position than J&J, because 
the university's research is not done for the purpose of even- 
tually marketing profitable products. If J&J mailed results of 
this research to health professionals, its communications 
would come under Food & Drug Administration examina- 
tion, which would be more restrictive than a first amend- 
ment review. A J&J-sponsored press conference, because it 
involves disseminating information to the public through the 
news media, would be subject to greater scrutiny under first 
amendment guidelines. Full-page advertisements by J&J in 
magazines and newspapers, even if they described only the 
benefits of Retin-A, would likely be deemed commercial 
speech.ll Even if this is commercial speech, some analysts 
argue that the public interest component deserves full first 
amendment protection (Radner 1993). 
Summary of the identification problem. None of the stan- 
dards forwarded in New York Times (1964), Bigelow (1975), 
and Virginia Pharmacy (1976), the major commercial 
speech cases preceding Central Hudson (1980) (see Table 
1), truly clarifies the commercial speech conundrum. Thus, 
the threshold decision of whether certain communications 
amount to commercial speech can sometimes be a difficult 
one for the Court. 
11Advocacy advertising is being increasingly scrutinized by the FTC. On 
balance, the FTC's approach and the recommendations of commentators 
(cf. Cutler and Muehling 1989, 1991; Middleton 1991) are very similar to 
the type of analysis conducted in first amendment challenges. 
The R.J. Reynolds "Of Cigarettes and Science" advertorial is another ex- 
ample of complex, competing positions. The FTC alleged that the ad mis- 
represented the health risks related to smoking, and R.J. Reynolds consent- 
ed to cease the ad (In Re R.J. Reynolds 1990). 
Commentators have been particularly critical of the Nutrition Labeling 
and Education Act (1990), suggesting that it violates the First Amendment 
(Blim 1994). 
The Court initially influences the outcome of a dispute 
by categorizing the controversial speech as noncommercial 
and thereby virtually impossible to silence. Firms attempt to 
sway the Court in this direction by cloaking their commer- 
cial messages with controversial or noncommercial subject 
matter. However, the tendency seems to be to classify more 
and more types of mixed speech as commercial speech, 
which is then judged according to Central Hudson, Posadas, 
and subsequent litigation. 
Applying the Current Standard 
After determining that the speech in question is commercial, 
the Court must examine the content and method of the 
speech in the context of the conflicting rights and interests 
involved (Collins and Skover 1993a, b; Kozinski and Banner 
1993; Smolla 1993). A listing of the primary issues/interests 
that must be considered by the Court is presented in Table 2, 
along with a brief description of each. 
The Court obviously will have a difficult time ensuring 
that all interests are maximized because of the inherent 
trade-offs involved. The right of a marketer to target adver- 
tisements to certain market segments might interfere with 
rights of those not wanting to see the ad or not wanting third 
parties to view the ads (Nesgos 1988). For example, for a va- 
riety of reasons some people may be offended by ads for 
contraceptives. Their inadvertent exposure to such ads is re- 
garded as less important than the right of others to be in- 
formed about contraceptive alternatives and the right of con- 
traceptive sellers to promote their products. Moreover, given 
broad public concern for minimizing the spread of AIDS, 
the recognized utility of contraceptive use has increased. 
However, if the ads are offensive in their execution, for ex- 
ample, vivid photography and colorful language, the Court 
may decide to protect society at large from such materials. 
Thus, the Court must balance the various rights in the 
context of existing trends and societal values. If a cure for 
AIDS is developed and is eventually affordable to everyone, 
the rights of those objecting to contraceptive ads may begin 
to dominate again, resulting in restrictions on contraceptive 
advertisements. At that point, such ads may be prohibited 
from all broadcast media but might be permitted in an infor- 
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mational format in print media targeted primarily at adults. 
The rights of the contraceptive seller would become sec- 
ondary and would therefore be constrained but not 
eliminated. 
A recent appellate decision involving the Adolph Coors 
Co. also illustrates the problems of separating intertwined 
rights (Adolph Coors Company v. Bentsen 1993). Coors 
sought permission to disclose the alcoholic content of two of 
its products on labels and in advertisements. Regulations of 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, dating back 
to 1935, forbid such disclosures. Coors convinced the trial 
court to enjoin the enforcement of this regulation. The ap- 
pellate court (10th Circuit) agreed, stating that the regulation 
failed the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test. 
Coors's right to advertise, the public's interest in disclo- 
sures, and the government's asserted interest in preventing 
alcohol strength wars among brewers are in conflict and 
must be harmonized. 
Other situations may encompass only the rights of the 
parties directly involved in the dispute. For example, when 
states attempt to establish behavioral standards for profes- 
sionals, for example, optometrists, physicians, and attor- 
neys, they risk first amendment violations. After Edenfield 
(1993) accountants are allowed to approach potential clients 
in person or by telephone, but attorneys are not yet permit- 
ted to solicit this aggressively. The Court must determine 
how to protect exposed citizens who need legal counsel but 
who might be susceptible to persuasive legal arguments, 
while at the same time safeguarding the right of others (at- 
torneys) to communicate with prospective clients. 
The rationale of Central Hudson, which was extended 
considerably in Posadas, will be used to decide issues such 
as these. Assuming the commercial communications are 
lawful and not misleading (Central Hudson, step #1), the 
weight attached to governmental interest in regulating the 
questionable communications must be judged (step #2). 
Rarely will a regulation be expunged at this stage. The logic 
underlying the contested rule will almost always be reason- 
able in terms of face validity, and the governmental body's 
articulated reasons for enacting the statute will usually be 
well intended. Step #3 will also typically result in an affir- 
mative answer: Most regulations advance the government's 
interests. In fact, the legislative process at all levels general- 
ly includes an analysis of the congruence between the gov- 
ernment's goals and the functioning of the law. 
Most important, the appropriateness of the commercial 
speech restrictions is finally evaluated by the Court. The test 
is whether the restrictions are reasonable or no more exten- 
sive than necessary not whether they are the least restrictive 
means possible. Thus, the Court must review arguments re- 
garding alternative promotional formats and message con- 
tent available to the marketer. 
Impact of Commercial Speech 
Regulations on Promotional 
Decisions 
At the present time, targeted promotional efforts aimed at in- 
forming interested and qualified prospects and customers re- 
ceive the maximum commercial speech protection. Commu- 
nications of demonstrable claims are generally also accept- 
able to the Court. This protection is decreased somewhat for 
highly persuasive efforts, especially if the seller is clearly 
more familiar with the product than buyers. Untargeted 
mass communications that attempt to do more than inform 
and that cannot be avoided by uninterested persons are 
closely scrutinized by the Court. 
Like marketers, the Court considers the impact of the 
commercial speech and its medium of delivery in applying 
Central Hudson. In reviewing statutes designed to control 
promotional alternatives, the Court has most often been crit- 
ical of absolute bans because they are overly broad, thus 
failing the fourth step of Central Hudson; that is, statutes 
must not only effectively prevent unwanted commercial 
speech through media restrictions, but they must not im- 
pinge upon allowable noncommercial speech. 
Attempts to regulate media have very consistently fo- 
cused on the particular advantages of those media from the 
marketer's perspective. The Court has learned that a partic- 
ular message is more effective when transmitted by one 
medium as opposed to another. The promotional activities 
most likely to be affected by commercial speech regulations 
are outdoor advertising, direct marketing, personal selling, 
and television advertising. 
Outdoor Advertising 
Numerous statutes have been enacted to limit or eliminate 
billboards and signs. Decisions dealing with these regula- 
tions often note that billboards and signs are publicly intru- 
sive: They cannot be ignored or avoided due to their physi- 
cal presence. The Court has issued enough opinions to date 
that could be used to draft legislation calling for the banish- 
ment of all commercial signs and billboards that are not 
within a few hundred feet of the establishment being adver- 
tised.12 Firms large enough to do business in multiple juris- 
dictions will face myriad regulations dealing with billboard 
advertising. Organizations that rely on outdoor advertising 
should begin to develop alternative, targeted forms of com- 
munication, especially in jurisdictions that are taking the 
lead in reducing visual clutter. 
For example, a Maryland federal district court recently 
upheld a City of Baltimore ban on billboard advertising of 
alcoholic beverages (Anheuser-Busch and Penn Advertising 
of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore 
1994). The court accepted the city's reasoning that bill- 
boards lead to the consumption of alcohol by minors with- 
out hearing any empirical evidence. This decision has been 
widely criticized (cf. Davis 1994) and will undoubtedly be 
appealed, but it illustrates the acerbic view of billboards held 
by many people. 
Direct Marketing 
Similarly, the private intrusiveness of direct marketing has 
made it a target of regulations aimed at diminishing market- 
12The president of one firm that operates numerous billboards declared 
that he was already diversifying his business in anticipation of the day when 
outdoor advertising is banned or severely restricted (Shaw and Pearson 
1994). 
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ing efforts that are thought to be too aggressive or generally 
bothersome. Few first amendment challenges to direct mail 
statutes have been raised to date; however, this area is like- 
ly to parallel the progress observed relative to billboards and 
signs.13 Once legislators and regulators determine how to 
limit direct marketing efforts without infringing on noncom- 
mercial speech, Central Hudson provides broad discre- 
tionary power for severely reducing the variety and effec- 
tiveness of direct marketing. Regulations in this area will be 
particularly complex for marketers to anticipate because of 
the overlapping interests of several federal agencies, includ- 
ing the Federal Trade Commission, Federal Communica- 
tions Commission, and the U.S. Postal Service. 
Regulations will most likely be aimed at restricting mass 
mailings or randomly generated telephone contacts that are 
not based on the identification of high-potential prospects. 
To minimize the likelihood of regulations that qualify under 
the First Amendment, organizations that employ direct mail 
must secure appropriate mailing lists. Mail campaigns 
aimed at persons who meet exacting market profile criteria 
are likely to provoke the least resistance, because such mail- 
ings will yield the fewest formal complaints. 
A similar admonition is relevant regarding unsolicited 
telephone selling. Because the phone lines that telemar- 
keters use for commercial messages are paid for by con- 
sumers, their demands for restrictions are likely to be sup- 
ported, at least until technology such as call-blocking is 
widely available (Cain 1994, p. 665). 
Personal Selling 
The activities of salespeople, although targeted at qualified 
prospects, have been affected by first amendment rulings. 
The cases related to the promotional efforts of attorneys can 
be conceptually extended to other salesperson-prospect situ- 
ations. To date, attorneys are generally permitted to describe 
their expertise, but they cannot personally approach individ- 
uals who are plainly in need of legal assistance. The Court 
has reasoned that attorneys possess superior knowledge re- 
garding the imminent legal dilemma and therefore might 
overstate the problem to gain business. Moreover, such con- 
sumers may be involved in emotionally charged situations 
that could interfere with their making sound decisions about 
retaining legal counsel The consumer is thus protected from 
being placed at a disadvantage by unscrupulous attorneys. 
Other situations exist where the seller's knowledge ex- 
ceeds that of the prospect relative to the offering in question. 
The potential for encroachment through regulation is con- 
siderable, particularly because the Court is more likely to 
allow regulations in situations where the commercial speech 
cannot be easily monitored by others. Thus, salesperson 
conduct is susceptible to regulation, because most salesper- 
son-client interactions cannot be observed by third parties. 
The current emphasis on ethical behavior by salespeople 
must be stressed by organizations in all industries so that ex- 
ternal regulations are not imposed (Schneider and Johnson 
13In Moser v. FCC (1993), a federal district court in Oregon outlawed a 
federal statute that allowed businesses to solicit customers over the phone 
only if they employed live operators (no computer dialing/messages). An 
appeal will probably be filed by the FCC. 
1992), and the claims of salespeople should be factually cor- 
rect and deal with issues that can be substantiated. Claims 
that are not verifiable, especially if they are common in in- 
dustries or markets where sellers are obviously more knowl- 
edgeable than buyers, could lead to localized attempts at 
regulating salesperson speech to protect customers. 
Television Advertising 
The pervasive impact of television advertising has resulted 
in a number of regulations that prompted first amendment 
objections. Certain products (e.g., cigarettes, distilled spir- 
its) are precluded from being advertised on television. The 
arguments here center on protecting certain vulnerable seg- 
ments, generally children, from repeated exposure to prod- 
uct advertisements if they are deemed to be incapable of as- 
sessing a product's utility. Future regulations of televised 
advertising are likely to focus on certain product classes, 
with further emphasis on restricting ads for additional prod- 
ucts during certain time segments.14 
Summary 
After reestablishing protection of commercial speech under 
the First Amendment during the late 1970s, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has once again decided to limit this protec- 
tion. The Central Hudson (1980) decision provided a four- 
part test that has been used to restrict both the content and 
method of commercial communication. The Posadas (1986) 
extension of Central Hudson supplies additional reasoning 
to limit commercial speech even further. 
Most first amendment commercial speech cases deal 
with efforts to constrain decisions regarding the type of ad- 
vertising medium, with ad content occasionally being con- 
sidered. At present, the Court is moving in the direction of 
diminishing the rights of the seller-advertiser. A continua- 
tion of this trend will affect all aspects of the promotional 
mix, leading Kozinski and Banner15 (1990, p. 653) to the 
following conclusion: 
...the commercial speech doctrine...is not cost free. It gives 
a government a powerful weapon to suppress or control 
speech by classifying it as merely commercial. If you think 
carefully enough, you can find a commercial aspect to al- 
most any first amendment case. Today's protected expres- 
sion may become tomorrow's commercial speech. 
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